

THE TRINITY REVIEW

For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh, for the weapons of our warfare [are] not fleshly but mighty in God for pulling down strongholds, casting down arguments and every high thing that exalts itself against the knowledge of God, bringing every thought into captivity to the obedience of Christ. And they will be ready to punish all disobedience, when your obedience is fulfilled.

January 1992

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The Intellectual Triunity of God

Joel Parkinson

The doctrine of the Trinity is essential to the orthodox Christian faith. Trinitarian thought pervades the New Testament and is presupposed in the central doctrines of the Incarnation (*Luke* 1:35), Atonement (*Hebrews* 9:14), Resurrection (*Romans* 8:11), and Salvation (*1 Peter* 1:2) as well as in the practices of water baptism (*Matthew* 28:19) and prayer (*Ephesians* 2:18). Consequently, there can be no doubt that failure to accept the Trinity will lead to fatal errors in the rest of one's theology. However, the Trinity is often viewed as a difficult if not self-contradictory concept. Is the Trinity really incoherent? The present article seeks to respond to this question with an emphatic "No."

The Doctrine of the Trinity

In essence, the doctrine of the Trinity may be outlined by the following three propositions:

1. There is only one God who is immutably and eternally indivisible and simple (*Deuteronomy* 6:4; *John* 17:3; *1 Corinthians* 8:6).
2. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are each fully and co-equally God (*John* 20:17; *John* 1:1; *Acts* 5:3-5).
3. The Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are distinct and not one and the same (*Mark* 1:10-11; *John* 15:26; *Hebrews* 9:14).

Now each of these affirmations is essential to the doctrine of God. To deny (1) is to fall into the error of tritheism. To repudiate (2) is to embrace subordinationism. To reject (3) is to settle for modalism. The reader may note that the personality of the Three is not explicitly stated. This is because the word "person" is not a Biblical term but one of convenience in theology. Nonetheless the *intent* behind the word "person" is wrapped up in these three truths. Call them what you will – persons, consciousness, or selves – whatever the Father is, the Son and the Holy Spirit are as well.

The Alternatives before Us

The only problem is that these three propositions appear to be self-contradictory or at least very puzzling. How can God be three and yet one? Or how can one God be three without being schizophrenic? It would seem that we have three alternatives before us:

1) We could deny one or more of the three propositions. But as we have already observed, to repudiate any of these affirmations leads to the heresies of tritheism, subordinationism or modalism, respectively. Hence we cannot deny any of these truths without committing theological suicide.

2) We could accept all three propositions as necessarily paradoxical. That is, we could maintain that they are each individually true and yet

collectively contradictory at the same time. But this not only defies the rules of logic, it is also unscriptural. The doctrine of Biblical inerrancy precludes the possibility of a real contradiction in Scripture, and the Biblical property of perspicuity or clarity thwarts the prospect of insurmountable difficulties in the Word of God. (See W. Gary Crampton's article, "Does the Bible Contain Paradox?" *The Trinity Review* Number 76.) Therefore it must be possible to reconcile these three Trinitarian truths.

3) We could humbly acknowledge our present lack of understanding and seek to find a resolution allowing us to consistently maintain all three truths. This is the only acceptable approach and is the one we shall pursue. So while it is true that the Trinity's actuality is a matter of faith, its coherence is open to rational examination.

Finding an Answer

Now the simplistic answer to those who assert it is a contradiction to say God is both three and one is to respond that he is three in a different sense than he is one. However, if we desire to be convincing, we should also try to define the senses in which God is three and one and do so in a way that preserves all three Trinitarian affirmations. For instance, one could say that God is three Persons with one divine nature. But though this is true, if it is left unqualified it implies tritheism. Three men clearly share a common human nature but are not indivisible. One man could be killed without necessarily endangering the existence and identities of the other two. So there must be something unique to the divine nature precluding such divisibility.

Perhaps the best solution offered to date to the problem of the Trinity is that proposed by the late Gordon H. Clark. He defined a person as a set of thoughts. That is, "a man is what he thinks" (*The Incarnation*, 1985, 54 and 64; *The Trinity*, 1985, 105 and 106). There are a number of clear advantages to this definition. Positively, a thinking entity exists personally ("I think, therefore I am"). He can have personal relationships. He has a will. Negatively, a non-thinking entity is not a person. We do not address a corpse as the person but as the

person's body. The personality survives physical death and is then separated from the body (*James* 2:26). So clearly the personality is connected with the mind and not the body.

Now I would modify Dr. Clark's definition slightly to say that a person is distinguished by *how* he thinks rather than *what* he thinks. This is simply because the content of human thoughts changes day to day without destroying the personality. I do not cease to be Joel Parkinson when I learn something new nor do I become someone else when my memory fails me. Yet concerning God, such a subtlety is irrelevant. His thoughts are all encompassing and immutable. Therefore *how* God thinks and *what* he thinks are one and the same. Accordingly, we shall adopt Gordon Clark's definition for the purposes of this proposal.

Clark goes on to show that the three divine Persons are distinct due to their differing thoughts. "Since also the three Persons do not have precisely the same set of thoughts, they are not one Person, but three" (*The Trinity*, 106-107). Such a distinction may on the surface seem peculiar since each of the divine Persons knows all truths (*1 John* 3:20; *Matthew* 11:27; *1 Corinthians* 2:11). One might then be inclined to conclude that the three Persons have the *same* thoughts. But what Dr. Clark is referring to is what I call the "subjective knowledge" of the Persons while their omniscience concerns "objective knowledge."

Now "subjective knowledge" consists of facts concerning one's personal experience while "objective knowledge" is truth regardless of one's experience. To say, "I am writing this article," is a subjective proposition; only I can say it. On the other hand, the statement, "Joel Parkinson wrote this article," is objective because it can be known and said by anyone. (Of course, God does not know anything *because* of his experience, since his knowledge is timeless and immutable. But this does not mean that he does not know his Earthly works. The terminology used here is simply intended to concisely distinguish between first person and third person propositions.)

Thus the subjective thoughts of the three divine Persons and their objective knowledge are not one and the same even though they are both all-encompassing. The Father does not think, "I will or have died on a cross," nor does he think, "I will or do indwell Christians." Only the Son can think the former and the latter is unique to the Holy Spirit. But all three know "the Son will die or has died on a cross," and "the Holy Spirit will or does indwell Christians." So the subjective thoughts distinguish the Persons even though their objective knowledge is shared and complete.

Experience

Applying this definition of "person" to the Trinity leads us to the notion of the "intellectual triunity" of God. This asserts that God has three subjective thoughts and one objective knowledge. Such a view of God sustains the personal distinctions within the Godhead, precluding the error of modalism. It also avoids subordinationism since each of the three remains equally omniscient. Moreover, shared and identical objective knowledge possessed by the three maintains a unity that is unique within the Godhead and negates tritheism.

There are, however, those who disagree with this assessment. Cyril Richardson charged that, "If there are three centers of consciousness in God, there are three gods; and no matter in what way we try to state their unity...they are still three" (*The Doctrine of the Trinity*, 94). More recently, John O'Donnell alleged that if there are three consciousness in God this is "obviously the same as tritheism" (*The Mystery of the Triune God*, 103). But these assertions are wrong. Tritheism requires three *separable* gods. That is, it must be possible to eliminate one while leaving the remaining two intact, or it must be possible to conceive of one independent of the others. But three omniscient Persons cannot be divided or separated.

The indivisibility of three *omniscient* Persons can be demonstrated as follows:

1. Omniscience means knowledge of all truths, without exception, whether past, present or future. This is true by definition.

2. God has such universal knowledge and is omniscient (*Isaiah* 46:10; *Hebrews* 4:13; *1 John* 3:20). There are some who attempt to limit God's knowledge to all past and present truths, but not all future truths, in defense of human free will (for example, see Richard Rice, *God's Foreknowledge & Man's Free Will*, 39, 54). But such attempts fail in the face of Scriptures which affirm that God foreknows the words (*Psalms* 139:4) and even the sins (*Deuteronomy* 31:21; *Jeremiah* 18:12) of men. Therefore if we accept the Bible as truth, we are forced to concede God's total omniscience.
3. God is also immutable (*Psalms* 102:27; *Malachi* 3:6; *James* 1:17; *Hebrews* 13:8). This again is the inescapable testimony of the Bible.
4. For God to be immutable and omniscient, he must also be immutably omniscient. This necessarily follows from Premises 2 and 3. Otherwise, he could learn something new in violation of his immutability and would not have previously known all things contradicting his omniscience.
5. One omniscient Person knowing all truths also entails comprehensive knowledge of the thoughts of other omniscient Persons. If, for instance, the Son did not know the Father's thoughts in entirety, he would not know all things.
6. Such penetrating inter-personal knowledge does exist within the Godhead. This is necessarily true since the three Persons are God and God is omniscient. But it is also the explicit teaching of Scripture. "No man knows the Son, but the Father; neither knows any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him" (*Matthew* 11:27). Here the Son's knowledge of the Father is placed on a level with the Father's knowledge of the Son. This parity of knowledge is demonstrated by the antithesis between the Father knowing the Son and the Son knowing the Father, by

that fact that neither attain this knowledge by revelation (as men do) but simply know it on their own, and by the fact that each "knows" (Greek: "epignoski" meaning "fully knows") the other. Similarly, the Holy Spirit knows the thoughts of the Father. "For what man knows the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knows no man, but the Spirit of God" (*1 Corinthians* 2:11). Again, this knowledge is intrinsic to the Holy Spirit since it is independent of any revelation (*1 Corinthians* 2:10). Hence, each of the three omniscient Persons eternally and immutably knows the thought of the other two completely.

7. For this to be the case, separability among the three is absolutely impossible. If there were to be a rift within the Godhead, then each of the Persons could no longer immediately know the thoughts of the others. But this could only occur if these thoughts were never known (denying that they were *ever* omniscient) or if they were to forget something (denying their *immutable* omniscience). So we see that the unique case of divine omniscience is only possible for the three Persons if they are utterly inseparable. Or, to put it another way, the fact of divine omniscience makes divisibility among the three thinking Persons metaphysically impossible.

Objection!

At this point someone might ask why or how the three divine Persons are omniscient. But a Christian is not at all obliged to explain why or how God exists as he does. He is only obliged to demonstrate the internal consistency of what is revealed about God in the Bible. God's nature is simply an eternal reality without a prior cause. We cannot point to some reason why he is as he is because to do so would imply something beyond God and empty him of his sovereign self-existence.

Someone might also object that they still cannot imagine how there can be three Persons in one God.

It all seems too involved and complicated to grasp. In response we simply need to recall that it was the intention of this article to demonstrate the logical coherence of God's intellectual triunity, not to imagine this triunity. It can be shown mathematically that one million times one million is equal to one trillion. But who can *imagine* a million, much less a trillion? God is unimaginable. That is why images of God are forbidden by the Second Commandment. We can demonstrate, however, that the Trinity is a rational doctrine by a step-by-step examination of the Scriptures.

Objection Overruled

We therefore conclude that the concept of the intellectual triunity of God helps to show the coherence of the Trinity. On the one hand, there are three subjective thoughts in the Godhead which cannot be reduced to one personality. On the other hand, there is one common objective body of knowledge to the three Persons. The omniscient content of this shared knowledge uniquely renders the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit indivisible. If they are indivisible, then they are one God. Yet we have not confounded the Persons.

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November, December 1985

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Clark Speaks from the Grave

Gordon H. Clark

Editor's note: More than a year before he died in April 1985, Dr. Gordon H. Clark had prepared an essay entitled Clark Speaks from the Grave, intending it to be published after his death. The Trinity Foundation has now published the lecture as a small book. What follows are brief excerpts from the lecture in which Dr. Clark replies to some of his critics: Cornelius Van Til, Vern Poythress, Robert Reymond, Gordon Lewis, and John W. Montgomery.

In all his critics he finds two failures: a "basic refusal to say what they mean," and a basic refusal to defend Christianity against worldly philosophy. Christian apologetics in the twentieth century, insofar as it is anti-Clark, is a failure. It fails either because it is empirical, or irrational, or both. With defenders of the faith like Van Til, Poythress, and Montgomery, Christianity needs no enemies.

Criticisms against the work of Gordon H. Clark made by Reformed theologians, and some others, hardly mention the details of his theology as stated in his *What Do Presbyterians Believe?* and his several commentaries on New Testament books. If there are some theological objections, such as those against his view on the incomprehensibility of God in *A Complaint Against the Philadelphia Presbytery of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church* (a complaint lodged by Clark's detractors against the presbytery because the presbytery voted in 1944 to ordain Clark), these theological objections quickly become more philosophical and epistemological. Rather

than being strictly exegetical, they are directed against his alleged "rationalism." Naturally the theology and the philosophy permeate each other. This controversy, in which after five years the General Assembly refused to rebuke the presbytery, continued on academically to his death. Since Clark's many publications were read and criticized by scholars outside that denomination, the philosophic or apologetic controversy is worthy of careful study.

From the philosophic point of view, so far as one can appeal to antiquity, it was a controversy between Plato and Aristotle, or, in Christian terms, between Augustine and Aquinas. Naturally this appeal cannot be interpreted too exactly, for Cornelius Van Til, who furnished the basic content of the *Complaint*, is best known as a Presuppositionalist and not as an Aristotelian. Nevertheless, and inconsistently as it would seem, he always maintained that the cosmological argument for the existence of God, though faulty as expressed by Aristotle and Aquinas, can be rephrased so as to be logically compelling. Unfortunately he never explained how.

Van Til's deficiency at this point is one reason, albeit a minor reason, by which to recognize that the controversy basically and fundamentally concerns the nature of logic and its use in theology. But the context is far wider than the Orthodox Presbyterian Church and Westminster Seminary. In the middle of the nineteenth century, Soren Kierkegaard denounced logic and installed passion on the throne

of theology. To be a Christian one must believe contradictions. Karl Barth continued with Paradox; and Emil Brunner declared that God and the medium of conceptuality *schliessen einander aus*—are mutually exclusive. Dooyeweerd and his followers, including Van Til, are not usually so extreme. Even so, Van Til asserted that "we dare not maintain that his [God's] knowledge and our knowledge coincide at any single point" (*A Complaint*, p. 5, col. 3, italics his or theirs). Some of Van Til's students have since tried to produce a Christian apologetic by rejecting the law of contradiction and combining empiricism, apriorism, and irrationalism into a synthetic diamond of many facets. One thing at any rate cannot be gainsaid: The nature and use of logic in theology is in this century a matter of great importance.

In addition to the usefulness and indispensability of the "trivial," the "platitudinous," and the "empty" logical forms, which alone determine that two statements are contradictories, or contraries as the case may be, the more common use fills the empty *a's*, *b's*, and *c's* with bears, stars, and the federal headship of Adam. There is no way to establish any article of the creed, much less a system of doctrine such as the *Westminster Confession*, without filling the form with Scriptural content. In view of Clark's commentaries on several New Testament books, it is ridiculous to charge him, as some of the more benighted apologists have done, with proceeding on the basis of logical one. Logic alone gives, $A(ab)$ $A(bc)$ implies $A(ac)$. Theology argues, All sinners are under the wrath and curse of God, All men are sinners, therefore all men are under God's curse. Or, All who are justified like Abraham are justified by faith, All who are justified are justified like Abraham, therefore all who are justified are justified by faith. This may sound academic, platitudinous, useless; but Paul did not think so in his letter to the Galatians. Steps such as these must be used in the formulation of every Christian doctrine. Another step, even a previous step, is the definition of justification. On the grounds that Poythress proposes, one would not know when, or even if, a respondent meant what Calvin and Hodge meant, and when, or even if, Poythress meant the Roman Catholic definition which confuses justification with sanctification.

This technical, professorial, academic platitudinarianism has serious implications for the ordination of prospective candidates for the ministry. The ordination vows of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, to which the most active of Clark's opponents belong, contain the question, "Do you sincerely receive and adopt the *Confession of Faith* and *Catechisms* of this church, as containing the system of doctrine taught in the Holy Scriptures?" Now, quite aside from the fact that without the law of contradiction "sincerely" can mean "insincerely," the ordinand thinks to himself—or, rather, has already thought—that the term *system* has several meanings. It can mean the arithmetical system of numbering from one to thirty-three; why, of course I believe it is a system. If the previous presbyterial examination questioned him about justification as a judicial, divine sentence, he can say, so it is, and (to himself) it is also a life-long process of good works. It is both instantaneous and temporally extended. One must not subject oneself to the platitudinous trivialities of the law of contradiction. Besides, "receive and adopt" is a phrase of no precise meaning. They are fuzzy terms, and in some sense or other I receive and adopt the *Confession* as containing the vague terminologies of Scripture.

Actually this was done, though not so professorially, by hundreds of ordinands in the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. until they altered the ordination vows in 1967.

Since Clark's complaints here so frequently depend on the absence of definitions and the refusal (of his critics) to defend an alternate theory, the injured apologete might reply that it is unnecessary to have any positive philosophy in order to show that Clark's views are unacceptable. He violates common sense, he severely restricts knowledge, he even contradicts himself. What he says just cannot be true. Of these objections the charge of self-contradiction seems even less than the others to require an alternate system to support it.

However, if the critic uses the law of contradiction, Clark can ask, By what theory do you justify your use of this law? How did you come to learn the requirements of logic? The critic is then faced with

the necessity of justifying his own method, for merely asserting that Clark contradicts himself is not, alone, a sufficient refutation. It assumes without foundation one of the points in question. This should be all the more evident since the days of Kierkegaard and Barth. Both of them explicitly accept and defend contradictory positions. The one supports himself on infinite passion and the other on Paradox. If the empirical apologetes could convict Clark of self-contradiction—and their attempts are far from successful—they would still have to defend some theory or other in order to refute his existential neo-orthodoxy. Therefore Clark can legitimately ask them whether they base their logic on sensory observation, and this is impossible, or whether they are Kantians to be destroyed by Hegel. One must on this account reject the idea that Clark can be refuted without one's accepting any definite systematic basis for the refutation, and hence his objections to their omissions are justified.

There is one further point that needs to be mentioned. It must be in the form of a footnote, or parenthesis—because, while so far everything has been well documented—this depends more on conversations, a letter or two, and perhaps some small article, than on published material. Even so, it is of tremendous importance. To avoid and to confute Clark's position, some of Van Til's disciples contend that God does not think in propositions, and hence dependence on "mere human logic" is an untrustworthy crutch. To this Clark made two replies. First, he remarked that his opponents cited no Biblical passage in which this is stated, nor did they deduce it by any "good and necessary consequence" from a group of such premises. Indeed, since the Bible is ninety percent propositional—commands and ascriptions of praise being the exceptions—it would be rather peculiar if the Bible would deny its own truths. Then, second, if God does not think in propositions how could he have given us all the information now contained in the sixty-six books? If he does not think that "David was King of Israel," how could he have framed that proposition for our instruction? Or, worse, if we say that God cannot think in propositions, we deny his omnipotence. And if we think in propositions and God does not, then Van Til's statement will be true, that God's knowledge and ours do not coincide at

any single point. Since we "know" that "David was King of Israel," God cannot know it, and therefore it is false. So are all the Gospels, and Christianity is a delusion.

After so much vigorous argumentation, is it necessary to engage in repetition so as to produce a concluding paragraph or two? If not necessary, it may yet be useful for those who have short memories, and also for those of the public who make no claim to competence in apologetics. Here then are some of the points on which Clark used to insist.

From beginning to end, Clark has given numerous examples of his critics' failure to define their basic terms. Poythress took pride in being ambiguous. The others at least omit the pride; but this does not atone for their ignorance of what sensation is, nor for the absence of any account of perception and imagery. Virtually all the essential components of a reasoned argument against Clark are missing. That is to say, they depend on unsubstantiated assertions.

Next, they allege scientific corroboration without having studied physics. One of them made ridiculous remarks on operationalism. Another discussed the law of gravitation without knowing what it is. None of them analyzed the actual methodology and procedures used in the laboratories. Then too, where one would most expect competence, their appeals to Scripture exemplify impossible exegesis; and where the Scripture supports Clark, they remain silent.

Some more than others misunderstand and therefore misrepresent Clark's position. The body of the text has indicated a few such cases. There are also logical blunders, as when one of the critics confused contraries with contradictories. Then there was the concluding discussion of individuation. Though it looms so large, almost the main point in some of their books, and omitted in very few, the reply has shown the critics' lack of any clear notion of what an individual is.

Underlying all these other complaints against the apologists, and permeating all their writings, is the basic refusal to say what they mean. They do not define their terms, with the result that their

objections against Clark are unintelligible. Of course, Clark was happy enough that they were unable to refute his views; but he was genuinely sad at another result. These men were self-styled apologists; and however much it is proper to refute a poor defense of Christianity, an apologist, if we remember *1 Peter* 3:15, must mainly direct his arguments against non-Christians. *Colossians* 2:8, where the *King James Version* is weak, really says, "See to it that no one takes you captive through hollow and deceptive philosophy, which depends on human tradition and the basic principles of this world rather than on Christ" (*NIV*). They must engage and refute the arguments of John Dewey, Herbert Feigl, Ernst Nagel, B. F. Skinner, Gilbert Ryle, and so on. Otherwise the world has grounds for sneering at the apologists' incompetence, and Christianity suffers. Of course, omniscience is a bit hard to come by, but the first and absolutely indispensable step is the definition of terms.